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FDIC/RTC SUITS AGAINST BANK AND
THRIFT OFFICERS AND DIRECTORSWHY NOW, WHAT'S LEFT?
JAMES T. PITTS*
ERIC W. BLOOM**
MONIQUE M. VASILCHIK***
INTRODUCTION

S TARTING with the creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank System in 19321 and continuing through the 1960s, thrift executives
profited by the disparity between long and short-term interest rates.
By utilizing the 3-6-3 Rule-pay three percent interest on deposits,
charge six percent interest on loans, and be on the golf course by 3:00
p.m.-thrifts made money.2 During the early 1980s, however, that
trend reversed and insured banks and thrifts failed in numbers not
seen since the Great Depression.
Where the blame lies for the profusion of bank and thrift failures
and their resulting cost depends on one's perspective, but certainly
there were many factors that contributed to the "thrift crisis. ' 3 When
concerns were expressed in the late 1970s and early 1980s about the
competitive disadvantage of thrifts in comparison with other segments
of the financial services industry, Congress was sympathetic and deregulated the thrifts largely in hopes that market forces would restore
their profitability. By 1987, that strategy had obviously failed. Congress then sought to "recapitalize" the thrift deposit insurance fund to
protect depositors. Again, the emphasis was on saving the industry
and not on changing the way it conducted business. Once the magnitude of the crisis became evident, however, Congress shifted its focus
and largely blamed the directors and officers ("D&Os") of many of
the failed institutions, alleging that excessive behavior and criminal
activity were principal causes of the industry's losses.'
T. Pitts is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Winston & Strawn.
Eric W. Bloom is an associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Winston &
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1. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).

2. Kathleen Day, S&L Hell The People and the Politics Behind the S1 Trillion
Savings and Loan Scandal 54 (1993).
3. See infra part L

4. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, Congress passed legislation in 1989- and 19906 that
dramatically increased the power of government regulatory agencies
to investigate and prosecute persons involved with financial institutions for fraud, waste and insider abuse. With these new powers, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Resolution Trust Corporation aggressively pursued the D&Os of many failed institutions in
an effort to recoup government losses.
The saying that "hard facts make bad law" applies more dramatically to the congressional and regulatory reaction to the thrift crisis
than is now appreciated. While there clearly was a crisis-and there
certainly were persons committing intentional fraud that caused a portion of the losses-the draconian measures passed by Congress were
unnecessary to prosecute those persons. Laws then on the books
would have been sufficient. What the new laws did do, however, was
to create a broad net that ensnared thousands of innocent persons
whose only wrongdoing had been to serve on the board of directors of
an insured institution. The FDIC and the RTC routinely assert negligence claims,7 not the graphic intentional and excessive conduct described to justify the new regulatory powers. Because of the political
blame shifting and the zealous positions taken by the FDIC and the
RTC, and their outside counsel, many innocent lives have been disrupted with no benefit to the American taxpayers.'
This Article explores the tug of war between defendant D&Os and
the FDIC and RTC and considers the changing rules governing litigation between them. Part I surveys the causes and features of the thrift
crisis and examines Congress' varied responses to the problem. Part
II looks at the permissible scope of investigations by the FDIC and
RTC into wrongdoings of potential defendant D&Os, particularly as
defined by the D.C. Circuit in 1994 in the seminal case, RTC v.
Walde.9 Part III considers the inconsistent standard of care with
which D&Os of federally and state chartered financial institutions are
legally charged in their conduct of official duties. Part IV discusses
the uncertain availability to defendant D&Os of affirmative defenses,
5. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery & Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.
(Supp. V 1993)).
6. The Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-647, § 2500, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified in scattered sections
of 18, 12 and 11 U.S.C.) (enacted as Title XXV of the Crime Control Act of 1990).
7. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (discussing § 212(k) of FIRREA
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993)) and whether simple negligence in
making a lending decision can give rise to a governmental assault on one's personal
assets).
8. See, e.g., Mollie Dickenson, The Real S&L Scandal, Worth Magazine, Sept.
1994, at 92 (describing damage caused by unwarranted RTC investigations and recounting story of a suit against a former chief financial officer of a New Orleans real
estate development company).
9. 18 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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such as contributory negligence and the failure to mitigate damages.
Finally, Part V examines the statute of limitations, and its exceptions,
for fraud and negligence suits against defendant D&Os. This Article
concludes that, with the hysteria surrounding the thrift crisis on the
wane, courts have trimmed the formerly sweeping powers of the
FDIC and RTC, giving way to more reasonable rules governing litigation against D&Os of failed financial institutions.
I.

BACKGROUND-THE THRiFr CRisis

Clearly, economic factors beyond the control of thrift institutions
contributed to the industry's troubles. In reaction to the inflationary
surge of the 1970s, the Federal Reserve Board changed its monetary
policy in 1979.10 Instead of pursuing a policy of stabilizing interest
rates, as it had previously, the Federal Reserve switched to a policy of
controlling the growth of the money supply. This change resulted in a
dramatic increase in interest rates, including the cost of funds at savings institutions. Because thrifts were locked into long-term, fixedrate mortgages, they paid more for funds than they earned on assets.
"This 'negative' interest rate mismatch was the beginning of the thrift
crisis as we know it."'"
Congress responded to what was described as the "disintermediation" of the thrift and banking industries 12 by passing major legislation.13 The legislation was designed to allow depository institutionsparticularly thrifts-to develop new products and markets to combat
the deposit outflow and to create new opportunities for profits. Unfortunately, as history now shows, "a number of thrift managers did
not have the expertise needed to utilize these new powers, and as a
whole the industry had great difficulty
in exercising its newfound pow14
ers in a safe and sound manner."'
Congress was also to blame for the crisis, however, because it deregulated the thrift and banking industries in 198015 and 198216 while at
10. House Comm. on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs, Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 295 (1989) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 54(I)], reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 86.
11. Id
12. Id. Between 1977 and 1981, money market mutual funds ("MMMFs") grew in

net assets from $5 billion to $166 billion. "Commercial banks and thrifts have borne
the cost of this rapid growth because their deposits represent a major source of the
MMMFs' new assets." James E. Tucker, Comment, Bank Sponsorship of a Money
Market Mutual Fund: Can It Survive Glass-Steagall?,3 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 195, 195
(1984).
13. See infra notes 15-16.
14. H.R. Rep. No. 54(1), supra note 10, at 297.
15. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
("DIDMC"), Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. (1988)). This statute blurred the lines between banks and thrifts by allowing
all depository institutions to offer interest bearing checking accounts, write residential
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the same time, it increased the deposit insurance ceiling from $40,000
to $100,000 without a readily identifiable justification. Moreover, the
Reagan Administration, and to a lesser extent the Bush Administration, were also at fault. Each administration sought to decrease government oversight of insured institutions during the period of
deregulation. Accordingly, they slashed the number of examiners. 7
In addition, the Reagan Administration's preoccupation with smaller
government obscured early warning signs of trouble. Regulators were
encouraged to "resolve" troubled thrifts by using novel methods that
kept the government's exposure "off budget." Added to this mix, was
the never-to-be underestimated avarice of a small group of thrift and
bank owners who were willing to commit massive fraud for personal
gain.
Against this backdrop of political naivete and personal greed entered upwardly spiraling interest rates and a nationwide economic recession. Fueled by new powers authorized under the Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,18 insured thrifts accumulated $1 trillion in deposits by the end of 1984. The Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, however, had only $2 billion to
insure them, down from $8 billion just a few years earlier. Nonetheless, voices from the industry expressed optimism:
At this point in time [1984], a thrift's charter is probably the envy of
a lot of commercial bankers. A thrift has broader powers than a
commercial bank; it has all the powers that they have plus the

to engage in the insurpower to make investments in real estate and
ance business and the brokerage business. 19
mortgage loans and make consumer loans. DIDMC also preempted state usury ceilings on mortgage loans, allowed federal thrifts to branch statewide and permitted all
associations to put up to 20% of their assets in commercial loans and corporate debt
instruments. Most importantly, DIDMC phased out interest rate caps on bank and
thrift deposits (Regulation Q of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) to "enable [depository institutions] to compete for funding with money market
mutual funds." H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), supra note 10, at 295.
16. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 ("Garn-St Germain"),
Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 12, 15, 26
and 42 U.S.C. (1988)). At the signing ceremony, President Reagan reportedly said, "I
think we hit a home run." Martin Mayer, The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery-The
Collapse of the Savings and Loan Industry 95 (1990). Described as the most significant piece of thrift legislation since the Great Depression, Garn-St Germain authorized thrifts to commit up to 10% of their assets to commercial or agricultural loans, to
increase non-real estate secured loans from 20% to 40% of assets, to invest 100% of
their assets in state or municipal securities and to increase from 20% to 30% the
permissible level of assets in consumer loans. H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), supra note 10, at
297.
17. H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), supra note 10, at 301.
18. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 11,
12, 15, 26 and 42 U.S.C. (1988)).
19. Gilbert G. Roessner, Growth Through Diversification of FinancialServices, 3
Ann. Rev. Banking L. 175, 175 (1984). Mr. Roessner was then Chairman of the City
Federal Savings & Loan Association of New Jersey. Id.
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The perception that the regulators were there to help added to this
sense of well being:
[T]he thrift industry has a set of regulators-the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board... and the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance
Corporation ...that is supportive of the efforts and initiatives of
their constituents. Their attitude seems to be: "The more we can
help our constituency to compete and prosper, the better regulatory
job we are doing." This attitude stands in stark contrast to those of
the other regulators, such as the Federal Reserve Board.2"

Underneath this exterior, the thrift industry was collapsing. By the
summer of 1986, the Treasury Department determined that legislative
action was necessary to recapitalize the FSLIC and restore public confidence. To avoid any budget effect, the twelve regional Federal
Home Loan Banks agreed to "donate" a total of $3.5 billion of their
profits to a government fund, which would in turn buy twenty-year
and thirty-year Treasury bonds through a newly created federal entity.
That entity would then use the bonds as collateral to borrow up to $15
billion, which, when added to increased assessments against thrifts and
money transferred from the sale of the assets of failed institutions,
would create a fund of $25 to $30 billion for "case resolutions."'' t Still,
some commentators considered the measure to be insufficient3 2
The thrift industry successfully defeated this proposal in the 99th
Congress, arguing that the increased premiums would cripple thrifts.3
The industry maintained that the deficit thrifts faced was less than $6

billion, 4 which they could grow out of. 5 Neither proved to be the
case.

20. Hans H. Angermueller, The Thrift Industry: A Breath of Fresh Air, 3 Ann.
Rev. Banking L. 155, 158 (1984). Mr. Angermueller was Vice Chairman of Citicorp.
Id at 155. The General Accounting Office was not as sanguine about the thrift regulator's role as cheerleader for the industry. See Letter from M. Danny Wall, Chair-

man, Federal Home Loan Bank Board to Frederick D. Wolf, Asst. Comptroller

General, General Accounting Office (Apr. 10, 1989) (complaining about the GAO's

finding that regulatory violations and unsafe and unsound practices at thrifts occurred

repeatedly and/or remained uncorrected, "which leaves the impression that lack of
supervisory or enforcement action contributed to the thrifts' failures") in General

Accounting Office, Thrift Failures-Costly Failures Resulted from Regulatory Viola-

tions and Unsafe Practices, G.A.O. Rep. No. B-232798, app. III, at 95 (1989). The

GAO turned out to be more accurate than Mr. Wall. "The lack of adequate supervi-

Without
sion and examination ...was one of the primary causes of the thrift crisis ....
adequate supervision, thrifts were free to engage in fraudulent and risky activities,
often at the expense of the FSLIC." H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), supra note 10, at 301.
21. Day, supra note 2, at 225-26.
22. Id.at 226.
23. H.R.Rep. No. 54(1), supra note 10, at 305. At the time, banks paid 8.33 cents

per $100 in deposits, but thrifts could have seen their premiums soar to 21 cents. Id.
24. Id.(citing letter from Edwin J. Gray, Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank

Board to the GAO (Jan. 27, 1986) (chastising the GAO for "overstating" the size of
the FSLIC insolvency at $6 billion)).

25. Some in the industry were concerned that if the FSLIC suddenly had money, it

would move to shut down ailing but open institutions. Moreover, the industry did not
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When Congress revisited the FSLIC recapitalization during the first
session of the 100th Congress, sufficient concern existed to push
through the Treasury Department's proposal as Title III of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987.26 "[T]he overall objective...
was to provide funding to stabilize the FSLIC, and to insure the long' 2' 7
term viability of the thrift industry at the lowest cost to FSLIC.
CEBA established the Financing Corporation as a government instrumentality authorized to borrow up to $3.75 billion in any calendar
year, but not to exceed a total of $10.825 billion. Congress was clear,
however, that there was no "full faith and credit" backing the Financing Corporation's indebtedness. 28 CEBA also loosened the restrictions on interstate acquisitions of failed institutions and extended for
five years the moratorium governing actions against institutions that
failed to meet regulatory requirements as a result of an acquisition. 9
In the year following CEBA, the thrift crisis deepened. At the end
of 1988, there were 2949 insured thrifts holding $1.35 trillion in assets. 30 Of those, Congress classified 754 thrifts holding $428.3 billion
in assets-representing almost one-third of all thrift assets-as insolvent or "troubled. '31 When the full extent of the "thrift crisis" finally

think it should bear the cost. There were those who believed that if action on recapitalization could be delayed, the problem would grow so big as to require a taxpayerfunded resolution. Mayer, supra note 16, at 158-59.
26. ("CEBA") Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. (1988)).
27. H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), supra note 10, at 312.
28. Even though this $10.825 billion proved to be wholly inadequate, the thrift
industry continues to be burdened with its repayment. The increased assessment to
pay the 1987 Financing Corporation bonds will contribute to a significant competitive
disadvantage in the near future. Currently, commercial banks insured by the Bank
Insurance Fund and savings associations insured by the Savings Association Insurance
Fund both pay an insurance assessment of 24 cents per $100 in deposits. The FDIC,
however, recently announced a reduction in BIF premiums to four cents. The General Accounting Office has predicted that thrifts will have to pay assessments even
higher than the current 24 cents due to a shrinking deposit base. Barbara A. Rehm,
Big Thrift Seeks Bank Charters to Beat Higher SAIF Premium, Am. Banker, Mar. 2,
1995, at 1. Industry representatives project an assessment of 30 cents by the year
2000. Robert M. Garsson, GAO Says Thrift Premiums May Rise Within Five Years,
Am. Banker, Mar. 3, 1995, at 1. Because of the flight from thrift to commercial bank
charters to avoid the higher assessment, regulators are now concerned that the thrift
industry will not be able to pay the FICO bonds and payment will have to come either
from the BIF insured banks or the taxpayers. Robyn Meredith, OTS Says Thrifts May
Be Unable to Meet Payments on FICOBonds, Am. Banker, Mar. 10, 1995, at 2. This
strategy is described as a "de facto merger of the [deposit insurance] funds." Barbara
A. Rehm, Bank Charter Bids by Thrifts Threaten BIF Premium Cut, Am. Banker,
Mar. 10, 1995, at 2.
29. CEBA § 414 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(m)(1)(A) (1988)).
30. H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), supra note 10, at 303. By the end of 1994, there were
only 1543 thrifts holding $774 billion in assets.
31. Id. These thrifts had a GAAP capital of less than three percent. Id.
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came into foCUS, 3 2 Congress sought to identify scapegoats and avoid
responsibility. The result was the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery & Enforcement Act of 1989. 33
Among other things, FIRREA established "organizations and procedures to obtain and administer the necessary funding to resolve
failed thrift cases and to dispose of the assets of these institutions." 34
The principal organization established by FIRREA was the Resolution Trust Corporation.35 FIRREA was also intended to "enhance the
regulatory enforcement powers of the depository institution regula'
tory agencies to protect against fraud, waste and insider abuse."
Not satisfied with its work the previous year, Congress revisited the
issue of thrift crisis in 1990. The House Judiciary Committee declared:
Since last August, when [FIRREA] became effective, the losses
from failed financial institutions have ballooned. Reports of criminal activity and grossly excessive behavior that led to the dramatic
decline of the savings and loan industry have proliferated. [This
bill] responds to the public outcry to bring to justice those who defrauded the savings and loan industry ....
The Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990,38 enacted as Title XXV of the Crime
Control Act of 1990, a9 dramatically expanded the government's power
and increased the potential exposure to criminal prosecution of persons involved with financial institutions. Part of the hysteria that propelled this act through Congress is reflected in the opening segment of
the House Report that accompanied H.R. 5269:
Society also pays a heavy price for the activities of "white-collar"
criminals. No more vivid or current example of this price can be
found than in the unfolding savings and loan scandal, in which executives of thrift institutions ...enriched themselves by fraudulently
diverting immense amounts of funds from those institutions. It is
estimated that the ultimate cost of this scandal may be as much as
32. The depth of the FSLIC insolvency was generally thought to be S140-S150
billion in 1989 dollars. Mayer, supra note 16, at 2. When added to the cost of money
over time, however, the cost increases to $300 billion by the year 2000. Id.
33. ("FIRREA") Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections

of 12 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)).
34. H.R.Rep. No. 54(I), supra note 10, at 307.
35. FIRREA § 501(a)(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b) (Supp. V 1993)).
36. I-.R. Rep. No. 54(I), supra note 10, at 307-08.
37. House Judiciary Comm., Crime Control Act of 1990, E.R Rep. No. 681(1),
101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 170-71 (1990) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 681()], reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6576-77.
38. Pub. L. 101-647, § 2500, 104 Stat. 4789, 4859 (codified in scattered sections of
18, 12 and 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)).
39. Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 12, 11 and
28 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)).
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$500 billion-an amount
that might otherwise be put to useful pur40
poses in our society.
Congress then set about making it a federal felony if any person:
(1) knowingly conceals or endeavors to conceal an asset or property from the [FDIC or RTC] acting as conservator or receiver... ;
(2) corruptly impedes or endeavors to impede the functions of [the
FDIC or RTC]; or (3) corruptly places or endeavors to place
an
41
asset or property beyond the reach of [the FDIC or RTC].
Congress also made it a crime to obstruct corruptly the examination of
any insured institution.4 2 Additionally, Congress prohibited the discharge in bankruptcy of certain obligations owed to the FDIC and
specifically empowered the FDIC to avoid fraudulent transfers of assets by institution-affiliated parties and debtors of an institution within
five years of the appointment of the FDIC as conservator or receiver.43 Thus, violations that had been administrative or civil became
criminal. The witch hunt was on to recover billions of dollars from
former executives of failed banks and thrifts.44
II. THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION
As a matter of course, when the RTC or FDIC becomes a conservator or receiver, the respective agencies investigate whether the association or bank has claims against former officers and directors, whether
it would be cost effective to assert such claims, and whether the
agency should seek a freeze or avoid the transfer of assets. 45 An Order of Investigation identifies the purpose of all RTC and FDIC investigations, and the propriety of the agencies' conduct thereafter is
measured against these purposes.46 The typical Order of Investigation
provides that the investigation is conducted
to determine whether (1) former officers, directors and others who
provided services to, or otherwise dealt with, [the institution] ...
may be liable as a result of any actions, or failures to act, in connection with or which may have affected [the institution] ... ; (2) the

[agency] should seek to avoid a transfer of any interest or any incurrence of any obligations; (3) the [agency] should seek an attachment
of assets; and (4) pursuit of such litigation would be cost-effective,
40. H.R. Rep. No. 681(I), supra note 37, at 69.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1032 (Supp. V 1993).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1517 (Supp. V 1993).
43. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)-(19) (Supp. V 1993).
44. The causes of the banking and thrift crisis of the late 1980s is better addressed
in other places. The authors recommend Kathleen Day, S&L Hell: The People and
the Politics Behind the $1 Trillion Savings and Loan Scandal (1993) (documenting the
history of the S&L crisis through stories of the principal players).
45. McVane v. FDIC (In re McVane), 44 F.3d 1127, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995); RTC v.
Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
46. See FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1255 (1993).
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considering the extent of the potential defendant's ability to pay a
judgment in any such litigation.47
Relying on these four purposes, the RTC and FDIC routinely issue
subpoenas early in the investigation seeking all institution-related
records that may be relevant to possible liability for negligence, gross
negligence and intentional misconduct. Furthermore, the subpoenas
also routinely demand personal financial records, including checkbooks, bank statements, alimony records, insurance records, financial
statements, trust records and inheritance documents.8 Targeted
D&Os of failed institutions have complained bitterly that the agencies
seek discovery of their personal papers to determine their respective
net worth. This type of discovery is an exercise every litigant would
love to pursue but which federal civil discovery rules expressly prohibit unless the financial records are found relevant to some litigated
issue or lead to relevant information.
In 1993, targeted D&Os began to contest the breadth of the administrative subpoenas, arguing that Congress did not sanction the FDIC
or RTC to peruse their personal financial records for any purpose
other than to determine liability. While the RTC, in unguarded moments, has conceded that it has sought financial records of former
D&Os under investigation to determine their net worth, 9 both the
RTC and FDIC, in litigation, have argued that the sought-after financial information is necessary for the investigation of possible wrongdoing, including the possibility of fraudulent transfers of assets. 50 In the
alternative, the agencies have argued that Congress accorded them
vast powers that include the authority to investigate a target's net
worth-a right that purportedly enables the agency to assess in a
meaningful manner the cost effectiveness of bringing a civil action. 5 '
The courts, at least initially, uniformly deferred to the agencies, agreeing with the RTC and FDIC in approximately twenty cases that Congress accorded them the broad subpoena power they claimed,
including the right to subpoena personal financial records.'
47. Walde, 18 F.3d at 944 (citing Amended Order of Investigation, J.A. at 17-A
(Sept. 11, 1992)).
48. See, e.g., id. at 945-46 (detailing personal financial information sought by
subpoena).
49. Affidavit of D. Gay Walde, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Administrative Subpoenas Duces Tecum and in Opposition to Petition of Resolution
Trust Corporation for Summary Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas Duces Tecum 3, RTC v. Walde, Misc. No. 92-419, 1992 WL 448858 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 1992).
50. Appellee's Brief at 20-28, RTC v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 925495).
51. Id at 28-36.
52. See, eg., RTC v. Frates, 860 F. Supp. 5, 6 (D.D.C. 1994) (granting enforcement
of RTC's administrative subpoenas duces tecum requesting personal financial information); RTC v. Liebert, Misc. No. 93-032 (D.D.C. March 2, 1993) (granting RTC's
petition for expedited summary enforcement of administrative subpoenas duces tecum); RTC v. Brown, Misc. No. 93-17 (D.D.C. Feb 18, 1993) (granting RTC's petition
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The routine enforcement of agency subpoenas by district courts
came to a screeching halt in RTC v. Walde 3 when the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit unexpectedly
granted a thrift official's motion to stay an order enforcing an RTC
subpoena. The Walde court's holding surprised both government and
private attorneys who were long accustomed to the judiciary's utter
deference to agency investigative practices. Given the novelty of the
Court of Appeals' stay and the implications of such a decision, district
courts both inside and outside of the D.C. Circuit-where most enforcement actions are filed-commenced a practice of staying enforcement actions pending final resolution of Walde.
A.

The Walde Appeal

On appeal to the circuit court, both the RTC and the appellant William Walde agreed that the Supreme Court, in United States v. Morton
Salt Co.5' and United States v. Powell,5' set forth the applicable standard against which the validity of the RTC subpoena would be measured.5 6 In Morton Salt, the Supreme Court held that, at least where
corporate records are sought, the agency subpoena
for summary enforcement of administrative subpoenas duces tecum); RTC v. Koch,
Misc. No. 93-003, 1993 WL 177736, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 1993) (enforcing RTC's
administrative subpoenas duces tecum); RTC v. Silveous, 812 F. Supp. 244, 245
(D.D.C. 1993) (ordering former officer of a failed insurance institution to produce
personal financial records); RTC v. Green, Misc. No. 92-503 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 1993)
(enforcing RTC's administrative subpoenas duces tecum); RTC v. Adams, No. 92-492,
1993 WL 56177, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 1993) (enforcing RTC administrative subpoena
duces tecum), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. RTC v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 947
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the RTC has authority to subpoena some personal financial information such as bank statements of officers and directors); RTC v. Ringer,
Misc. No. 92-500, (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 1993) (granting summary enforcement of RTC's
administrative subpoenas duces tecum); RTC v. Baldini, Misc. No. 92-0466, 1992 WL
469735, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1992) (enforcing RTC's subpoena that requested the
production of documents relating to respondent's personal assets and asset transfers);
RTC v. Walde, Misc. No. 92-419, 1992 WL 448858, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 1992) (enforcing RTC subpoenas duces tecum), aff'd in partand rev'd in part,18 F.3d 943 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); RTC v. Towne, No. 92-451, 1992 WL 404159, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1992)
(granting summary enforcement of RTC administrative subpoenas duces tecum); RTC
v. Lopez, 794 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1992) (enforcing RTC subpoena requests for bank
statements, tax returns and insurance policies). But see Freese v. FDIC, 837 F. Supp.
22, 24 (D.N.H. 1993) (finding that the FDIC "may not freely peruse personal financial
records in order to determine the party's financial ability to satisfy a judgment"); RTC
v. Feffer, 793 F. Supp. 11, 14 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding that "even the broad statutory
powers afforded the RTC are insufficient to justify this extreme and unprecedented
invasion of personal privacy").
53. 18 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
54. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
55. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
56. Appellee's Brief at 15, RTC v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 925495); Appellant's Brief at 23-25, RTC v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 925495).
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is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the
demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. "The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms,
that the disclosure sought shall not be
57
unreasonable."

In Powell, the Supreme Court elaborated, noting that an administrative subpoena is valid where:
the investigation [is] conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, ....
the inquiry [is] relevant to the purpose, that the information sought
is not already within [its] possession, and ...

the administrative

steps required by the Code have been followed ....
58
In short, the subpoena is enforceable if the document demands are
reasonably related to one or more of the identified purposes of the
Order of Investigation.
While Walde challenged three of the four purposes, he focused primarily on the RTC's assertion that the agency was free to subpoena
records to assess the cost-effectiveness of litigation, a position that
plainly represented the Achilles' Heel of the RTC's efforts to enforce
the subpoena. Walde recognized that" '[t]he authority of an administrative agency to issue subpoenas for investigatory purposes is created
solely by statute.' 59 Therefore, he argued, Congress' failure in FIRREA to authorize specifically and expressly a right for the banking
agencies to investigate a target's net worth was dispositive that no
such right was ever granted.6° In support, Walde noted that Congress'
silence here was especially persuasive because Congress has, on occasion, granted such authority to the United States in other
circumstances. 6 '

Specifically, Walde noted that section 3611 of the Crime Control
Act of 1990 explicitly authorizes the United States to have discovei
regarding the financial condition of a debtor in advance of judgment.
In the legislative history of this section, Congress observed that,
although the financial condition of a debtor was not relevant to liability for damages, "permitting reasonable discovery of financial condition prior to judgment allows the United States to determine at an
early phase of the case whether the debtor will be able to [pay]; if not,
the matter may not be worth the investment of prosecutorial re57. Morton Salt, 338 U.S at 652-53 (quoting Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946)).
58. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58.
59. Appellant's Brief at 12, RTC v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 925495) (quoting Peters v. United States, 853 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 3 B.

Mezines et al.,
Administrative Law § 20.02 (1988))).
60. Id. at 12-13.
61. Id-

62. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3611, 104 Stat. 4789, 4939 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 3015
(Supp. V 1993)).
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sources." 63 In contrast, the Banking Law Enforcement title of the
same Act wholly failed to accord the RTC the same broad powers.
Because Congress granted the power to demand prelitigation discovery of personal financial information in section 3611 of the Crime
Control Act but did not do so in the whole of the Banking Law title,
Walde argued Congress could not have intended to accord the RTC
the sweeping powers the agency so desired.'
Walde also relied upon a string of decisions in which courts have
denied the efforts of civil litigants and administrative agencies to discover the net worth of a potential defendant. In Sanderson v. Winner,65 for example, the Tenth Circuit determined that litigants are not
entitled to discovery of personal financial documents of the other litigants unless such information is necessary to determine a party's potential liability. In so holding, the court concluded: "Ordinarily
courts do not inquire into the financial responsibility of litigants. We
generally eschew the question whether litigants are rich orpoor. Instead, we address ourselves to the merits of the litigation.'
Walde further relied on the Fifth Circuit's decision in FTC v. Turner67 to support Sanderson.6s There, the court of appeals denied the
Federal Trade Commission's attempt to enforce a subpoena seeking
personal financial records intended to assist the agency in ascertaining
whether the respondent "ha[d] sufficient financial resources to make
worthwhile a civil damage action."' 69 While acknowledging that such
information "would be interesting to any person or agency considering a civil suit for damages," the Fifth Circuit concluded that the respondent's "financial status, like the financial status of most putative
defendants, is not relevant to any issue that will be raised in the contemplated lawsuit. ' 70 The court of appeals therefore affirmed the district court's decision not to enforce the subpoena, holding that "the

63. Appellant's Brief at 12-13, RTC v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No.
92-5495) (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. S17603 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Grassley)).
64. Id at 13 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[W]here
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.")(citation omitted));
United States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating the same proposition);
California Rural Legal Assistance Inc. v. Legal Svs. Corp., 917 F.2d 1171, 1175-77 (9th
Cir. 1990) (stating the same proposition).
65. 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975).
66. Id at 479.
67. 609 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1980).
68. Appellant's Brief at 15-17, RTC v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No.

92-5495).
69. Turner, 609 F.2d at 744.
70. Id at 745.
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public need for this information does not justify the pretrial invasion
of [respondent's] privacy."'"
The RTC countered that, contrary to Wade's representation, Congress specifically instructed the RTC to "minimize[ ] the amount of
any loss realized in the resolution of cases." 72 Because Congress also
accorded the agency authority to subpoena records "'for purposes of
carrying out any power, authority or duty with respect to an insured
depository institution,' 73 Congress had authorized the RTC to discover a putative defendant's net worth so that the agency could allocate its limited funds wisely. As to Walde's reliance on Sanderson and
Turner, the RTC argued that the scope of the former was confined to
civil discovery-and therefore lacked relevance to the enforcement of
an administrative subpoena- 74 and that the latter was not good law
in the D.C. Circuit.7'

B.

The Walde Decision

In March 1994, the D.C. Circuit handed down what was plainly a
compromise decision. While on its face the holding provided a partial
victory to both the agencies and defendant D&Os, in practice it allowed the RTC and FDIC to subpoena almost everything they need to
determine a target's net worth.
The D.C. Circuit's analysis was an attempt to discern the intent of
Congress. Complicating this mission, however, was the court's own
finding that Congress failed to offer any "clues" in "the language and
history of FIRREA... as to whether [it] intended to authorize the
RTC to use its subpoena powers for the purpose of determining which
71. Id. at 746. Federal courts have applied a similar "rule of reason" in like circumstances. While it is well established that a party's financial status is relevant and
discoverable where punitive damages may be awarded, the D.C. Circuit will not compel discovery of such records unless and until there is first a determination of liability.
See e.g., John Does I-VI v. Yogi, 110 F.R.D. 629, 633 (D.D.C. 1986) (stating that
defendant's financial status "should not be revealed until necessary to prove up punitive damages").
72. Appellee's Brief at 28, RTC v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 925495) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(iv) (Supp. V 1993)).
73. Id-(quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(I)(i) (Supp. V 1993)).
74. Id. at 31-32 (stating that rules of civil discovery "do not govern administrative
subpoenas"); see also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950)
(discussing the specific limitations on judicial subpoena power); Bowles v. Bay of New
York Coal & Supply Corp., 152 F.2d 330, 331 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that rules of civil
procedure do not apply to restrict or control administrative subpoenas); EPA v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 836 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that while the
administrative subpoena cannot constitute a "fishing expedition," the subpoena was
not required to be connected to the investigation of a charge)(citation omitted)).

75. Id. at 32-34; see also FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.d 1086, 1089
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (concluding that the Turner court's statement that net worth was not
relevant to the inquiry was "mere dictum for which the Turner court provided no
explanation").
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of the possible targets
of an investigation were sufficiently wealthy to
'7
warrant pursuit."
Notwithstanding Congress' failure to address the issue, the court
plodded on, rendering what is a legislative-type compromise. It balanced the historic "latitude" accorded agencies "seeking the information they deem relevant to their duties"' with the equally historic
judicial concern for privacy rights.7 8 The court attempted to split the
difference: "[W]e think," the court held, "that the RTC must have at
least an articulable suspicion that a former officer or director is liable
a subpoena for his personal financial
to the failed institution '7before
9
information may issue."
With this compromise, the court apparently hoped to reign in the
RTC, preventing it from invading the privacy of directors or officers in
the absence of some likelihood of liability. Assuming that to be the
D.C. Circuit's motivation, the court failed miserably for several
reasons.
First, the decision itself lacks judicial credibility, appearing instead
to be an exercise in intellectual gymnastics. On the one hand, the
court recognized that Congress never spoke to the issue of whether
the RTC may subpoena documents for the purpose of determining the
cost effectiveness of a civil action.8 0 On the other hand, the court presumed that Congress intended to accord the RTC the right to prelitigation discovery on a putative defendant's net worth so long as the
76. RTC v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
77. Id. at 949.
78. Quoting Morton Salt, the D.C. Circuit affirmed that "'corporations can claim
no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.'" Id. at 948 (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)). The court further
relied upon the high Court's decision in Interstate Commerce Cornm'n v. Brimson,
154 U.S. 447 (1894), in which the Supreme Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment right to privacy extends to personal papers:
[I]t cannot be too often repeated.., that the principles that embody the
essence of constitutional liberty and security forbid all invasions on the part
of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home, and
the privacies of his life.... [O]f all the rights of the citizen, few are of
greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the
right of personal security, and that involves, not merely protection of his
person from assault, but exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers
from the inspection and scrutiny of others. Without the enjoyment of this
right, all others would lose half their value.
Walde, 18 F.3d at 948 (quoting Brimson, 154 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added)). Finally,
the D.C. Circuit relied upon Justice Holmes' famous admonition:
"Anyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth Amendment would be loath to believe that Congress intended to authorize one of
its subordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions into the fire and to direct
fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime."
Walde, 18 F.3d at 949 (quoting FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06
(1924)).
79. Walde, 18 F.3d at 949.
80. Il at 948.
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agency could articulate a theory of liability."' The court would have
been more intellectually honest had it simply ruled that Congress
never accorded the RTC any power to subpoena such records for the
purpose of determining cost effectiveness, or alternatively, that the
language relied upon by the RTC reflected an intent to grant such
powers. The middle of the road position, however, required the adoption of a standard made out of whole cloth.
Second, the decision is rife with loopholes. Early in the opinion, the
court held that many of Walde's personal financial documents may be
relevant to one or more of the other purposes contained in the Order
of Investigation, particularly whether the target fraudulently transferred assets.8' As practitioners in the industry are quick to note, the
RTC and FDIC have only rarely relied upon their powers to freeze
assets or set aside asset transfers. By including language indicating
that the agency is investigating possible fraudulent transfers in its Order of Investigation, the RTC frees itself to discover a putative defendant's net worth.
As proof, one need only look to the district court opinions since

Walde. They have generally enforced similarly broad subpoenas, finding that financial records are relevant to the agency's investigation
into the existence of fraudulent transfers.as As a result, these courts
have not even required the agency to articulate any suspicion of liabil-

ity before enforcing the subpoenas.'
A third problem with the decision lies in the "articulable suspicion"

standard itself. At least in its early stages, this standard has proven to
be an artificial barrier to enforcement of administrative subpoenas.
81. Id at 949.
82. Id at 947-48.
83. See, e.g., RTC v. Burke, 869 F. Supp. 15, 19 (D.D.C. 1994) ("[The Court finds
that a current statement of assets and liabilities, as well as the last three years of tax
returns, are reasonably relevant to the issue of the Respondents' liability and to the
RTC's need to investigate whether it should ... seek a judicial attachment of current
assets."); RTC v. Adams, 869 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1994) ("The Court finds that
each category of information sought is reasonably relevant to the RTC's purpose of
investigating respondents' potential liability. . . ."); RTC v. Barton, Misc. No. 94-284,
1994 WL 725327, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1994) (containing similar language regarding
the relevance of financial statements); RTC v. Frates, 860 F. Supp. 5, 6 (D.D.C. 1994)
("The Court finds that each category of information sought is reasonably relevant to
the issues of liability....").
84. Burke, 869 F. Supp. at 18 ("If and only if, the Court finds that the ... subpoena requests are not reasonably relevant... the Court must then turn to the question of whether the RTC has an articulable suspicion of liability."); Adams, 869 F.
Supp. at 3 (stating that a showing of articulable suspicion "is required only where the
RTC subpoenas personal financial information for the sole purpose of assessing the
cost-effectiveness of litigation"); Barton, 1994 WL 725327, at *1 (stating that "because
the.., subpoenas request information relevant" to the investigation, "it appears unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the RTC has demonstrated an 'articulable suspicion' that a former officer or director is liable"); Frates, 860 F. Supp. at 6
("[T]he court need not determine whether the RTC has shown a reasonable suspicion
of liability.").
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District courts have routinely accepted unsupported and conclusory
representations of negligence.8 5 Consequently, the RTC and FDIC, to
obtain documents sufficient to assess a target's net worth, can always
submit a blanket declaration or affidavit alleging that mismanagement
or poor underwriting has caused losses to the institution. The agency
will not be required to offer any evidence in support.
If the Walde decision has curbed RTC and FDIC excesses at all, its
force may best be likened to a line in the sand. Although the D.C.
Circuit was willing to accord the RTC much latitude, it has at least put
the RTC on notice that it will not countenance any subpoenas that
step over that already generous line. Indeed, where the RTC or FDIC
has crossed that barrier, the courts have been quick to deny
enforcement.86
Notwithstanding the superficial language of compromise contained
in the Walde opinion, the FDIC and RTC enjoy subpoena rights in
excess of that of their sister agencies. These broad powers allow the
FDIC and RTC to invade the most personal financial documents of
former officers and directors, even though these officers and directors
have not yet been found liable. As a result of the expanding nature of
D&O liability and the truly invasive subpoena powers of the RTC and
FDIC, the notion of joining the board of directors of a financial institution has become repugnant to many. Respectable business people
who have little to gain but much to lose by subjecting themselves to
the ever-shifting political winds find it simply no longer worth the exposure in both emotional and financial terms.
III. Ti

STANDARD OF CARE

While the Walde decision represented a pyrrhic or, at best, limited
victory for D&O defendants, more significant victories have been
achieved with respect to the standard of care against which D&O defendants' conduct is to be measured. Because the D&O's exposure to
liability correlates directly with the degree of care with which they are
legally charged, the significance of such decisions cannot be
understated.
85. McVane v. FDIC (In re McVane), 44 F.3d 1127, 1140 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding

the articulable suspicion requirement satisfied by RTC affidavit stating that institution
lost $9 million due to insider loans); Barton, 1994 WL 725327, at *2 (finding the articulable suspicion standard satisfied by RTC affidavit stating that losses were caused
by insufficient underwriting).
86. For example, in RTC v. Thornton, 41 F.3d 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the D.C.
Circuit held that the RTC lacked statutory authority to subpoena financial documents
solely to assess the cost effectiveness of pursuing litigation once litigation commenced.
1M2 at 1546. Similarly, in McVane, the Second Circuit denied enforcement of a subpoena that sought the personal financial records of a target's family. McVane, 44 F.3d
at 1138-39. The Second Circuit determined that these individuals did not relinquish
protection of their privacy rights "by virtue of marriage or other familial relationship"
to the target Id. at 1137.
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A. The National Standard of Care
From December 1993 through December 1994, three different
courts of appeals found that FIRREA "pre-empt[ed] federal common
law and establish[ed] a gross negligence standard of liability for officers and directors of failed federally chartered financial institutions."' Section 212(k) of FIRREAas provides:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be
held personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by,
on behalf of, or at the request or direction of the Corporation...
for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that
demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are defined and determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this
paragraph shall impair89 or affect any right of the Corporation under
other applicable law.
Relying on this section, these courts concluded that Congress spoke
directly to the issue of the minimum standard of care that must be
breached before liability may be imposed. In so deciding, these courts
rejected a flurry of RTC and FDIC arguments to the contrary.
In RTC v. Gallagher,90 the first of the three appellate courts to have
addressed the issue, the RTC argued that section 212(k) was designed
to nullify state laws that prohibited liability for anything but intentional misconduct." In other words, Congress, according to the RTC,
enacted this section not to enact a heightened standard of care for
most of the states, but rather to loosen the standard of care in a handful of states. If, support, the RTC argued that if Congress wished to
abolish all claims for simple negligence, Congress would have employed the term "may only"-and not "may"-in the first sentence of
section 212(k), thereby making clear that only gross negligence and
more culpable conduct would subject D&Os to liability. 2 The Fifth,
Sixth and Seventh Circuits, however, found that the word "may" connotes the permissive nature of the RTC's right to bring a cause of
action for gross negligence "rather [than] as a qualification which undermines the very cause of action the section creates."'93
87. RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 418 (7th Cir. 1993); see also FDIC v. Bates, 42
F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that FIRREA imposes a gross negligence standard of care even in states that have statutes absolving director negligence); RTC v.
Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1365 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the standard of care under
Louisiana law for director liability is gross negligence).
88. FIRREA § 212(k) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993)).
89. Id
90. 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993).
91. Id at 418.
92. Id at 420.
93. RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1361 (5th Cir. 1994). "he Gallagher Court

reached the same conclusion, noting that "the word 'may' refers to the right of the
[RTCJ to bring an action under this section. 'May' cannot reasonably be read to qualify the gross negligence liability standard and is therefore irrelevant to the substance
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The RTC and FDIC also have argued that the last sentence of the
section "saves" both state and federal common law claims from preemption. This sentence, generally referred to as the savings clause,
provides: "Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right
of the Corporation under other applicable law." 94 That Congress saw
fit to preserve expressly the agencies' rights under other applicable
law without limitation, the agencies have argued, reflected a legislative determination that the section was not intended to preempt federal common law claims. But the courts, having found that Congress
created a national minimum standard before liability may attach, determined that such an interpretation would be nonsensical in that the
savings clause would eviscerate the very standard created by Congress
in that paragraph. In RTC v. Miramon,95 for example, the Fifth Circuit found that "[r]eading the savings clause to nullify the substantive
portion of the section would violate 'the elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one
part inoperative.' ,,96 In FDIC v. Bates,97 the Sixth Circuit similarly
reasoned that "[i]f the court reads the savings clause to preserve simple negligence claims, then the gross negligence standard explicitly articulated in the savings clause is redundant, meaningless
surplusage." 98
The courts of appeals' unanimous rejection of the RTC's reading of
section 212(k) no doubt reflects a reluctance among those courts to
expand the role of federal common law beyond its historically parameters. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Gallagher,federal common law
should apply only in those "few and restricted" situations99 "[w]hen
Congress has not spoken to a particular issue and there exists a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest in the use of state
law."' 00 Here, where Congress has been found to have "spoken" to
the issue at hand, the need for federal common law disappears.
The preceding troika of decisions-Gallagher, Bates and
Miramon-representsa body of appellate case law that has accorded
D&Os far more protection and solace than perhaps any other set of
D&O decisions. Indeed, because the vast majority of D&O claims do
of the provision." RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416,420 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting FDIC v.
Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 450 n.4 (10th Cir.) (Brorby, J., dissenting), cert. dismissed, 113
S.Ct. 516 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted).
94. FIRREA § 212(k) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993)).
95. 22 F.3d 1357 (5th Cir. 1994).
96. Id at 1361 (citations omitted).
97. 42 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1994).
98. ld at 372; see also Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 420 (noting that the RTC's reading
"would... swallow-up the specific language establishing a gross negligence standard
of liability").
99. Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 419 (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651

(1963)).
100. Id. (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313, (1981)) (internal
quotations omitted).
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not allege fraud or other intentional wrongdoing, the level of discretion accorded to these defendants before liability attaches is likely the
single greatest determining factor of liability or exoneration. The
gross negligence standard renders claims of simple negligence not cognizable under federal law. The number of cases the RTC and FDIC
can bring, much less prevail upon, therefore, is significantly
diminished.
B. Preemption of State Law
While the Gallagher,Bates and Miramon courts all found that section 212(k) preempts federal common law, the courts of appeals appear equally uniform in holding that section 212(k) does not preempt
state law. Specifically, in FDIC v. McSweeney 1 ' and FDIC v. Canfield,10 2 the respective courts of appeals found that the savings clause
in section 212(k) reflected Congress' concern to defer to states' determinations of the appropriate level of fault before liability may be
imposed.
On its face, the decisions of McSweeney and Canfield do not conflict
with the Gallagher,Miramon or Bates decisions. The former decisions
merely held that Congress, by speaking directly to the issue of a standard of care, preempted federal common law; the latter decisions determined that state laws were preserved under the savings clause.
Nonetheless, the respective courts' analyses appear irreconcilable.
For example, McSweeney concluded that Congress' use of the word
"may"-rather than the phrase "may only"-in section 212(k) reflected Congress' understanding that the RTC and FDIC could bring a
cause of action for a breach of a less stringent standard of care than
gross negligence, provided, of course, that the applicable state law so
allowed. 10 3 As the Ninth Circuit stated, "Had Congress intended this
authorizing provision to limit the FDIC to claims alleging gross negligence or greater culpability, it would have inserted the word 'only' in
the sentence." 10 This analysis is anathema to that adopted in Gallagher, Miramon and Bates.
As a consequence of the dichotomy of decisions, former D&Os may
confront differing standards of care depending both on the state in
which their institution is chartered as well as the nature of their former institution's charter. Specifically, the "national" standard of care
of gross negligence generally applies to those former officers and di101. 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992).

102. 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992).
103. McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 537.
104. kd; see also Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446 ("In order to uphold the district court's

construction of [§ 212(k)], we would have to construe the first sentence of the section
as saying that an officer or director may only be held personally liable for gross negligence. This would require us to insert a word into the statute, and we decline to do
so.").
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rectors of federally chartered institutions. Those officers and directors
of state chartered thrifts and banks, however, must look to the law of
the state of incorporation to determine the applicable standard against
which they will be judged. 10 5 Some states impute liability for simple
negligence, 1° while other states require gross negligence or willful
misconduct. 0 7 While the absence of a uniform standard of care may
seem odd to some (certainly to the RTC and FDIC), Congress has
found no need to preempt state law, nor does the Supreme Court believe that any national interest mandates the application of a single,
generally applicable standard." 8
105. RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he law presumptively applicable is the law of the place of incorporation."); RTC v. Camhi, 861 F.
Supp. 1121, 1126 (D. Conn. 1994) ("Charter Federal was chartered, organized, regulated and insured under federal law, and subsequently also was placed into receivership pursuant to federal law. In essence, Charter Federal was a creature of federal
law from its cradle to its corporate grave.") (quoting RTC v. Gallagher, 800 F. Supp.
595, 602 (N.D. Ill. 1992)) (internal quotations omitted); RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp
1359, 1362 (D. Utah 1993) ("Federal savings and loan institutions are federally
chartered, federally regulated, federally insured, and federally organized. Such comprehensive coverage leaves little or no room for state law claims."); RTC v. Farmer,
823 F. Supp. 302,307 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (same proposition). But see RTC v. Everhart, 37
F.3d 151, 153-54 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that state law, rather than federal common
law, governed the question of whether the applicable statute of limitations had run on
a claim brought by the RTC as for a federally chartered financial institution).
106. See, e.g., Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Munday, 131 N.E. 103 (Ill. 1921) (holding that simple negligence subjects officers and directors to liability in Illinois).
107. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Bums 1995); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 180.0828(1) (West 1992). In addition, as many as 30 states have adopted legislation
attempting to minimize exposure to D&Os. For example, many states have on their
books some form of the business judgment rule. Under this principle, jurors are instructed to accord directors and officers wide latitude in the exercise of their professional judgment, even if, in hindsight, the wrong judgment was made. See, e.g., RTC v.
Eason, 17 F.3d 1126, 1133 n.5 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the business judgment rule
"is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors or officers of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in an honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interest of the company. This rule is based on the assumption that the directors or officers of the corporation are better equipped than the
Court or the jury to make business judgments or decisions"); see also Va. Code Ann.
§ 13.1-690 (Michie 1993) ("A director shall discharge his duties as a director... in
accordance with his good faith business judgment of the best interests of the corporation."). For a further discussion of various state laws, see Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citade" Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty
Applicable to CorporateDirectors,57 Fordham L. Rev. 375 (1988). For those states
that have adopted the business judgment rule, it is a significant weapon in defending
suits alleging unintentional conduct. Id. at 376.
108. In O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994), the Supreme Court
found that uniformity of law was not a compelling justification to preempt the applicable state law:
Uniformity of law might facilitate the FDIC's nationwide litigation of these
suites, eliminating state-by-state research and reducing uncertainty-but if
the avoidance of those ordinary consequences qualified as an identifiable
federal interest, we would be awash in "federal common-law" rules.
1I at 2055 (citing United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 347 n.13 (1966)).
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IMPACr OF O'MELVENY ON AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

The Supreme Court's recent holding in O'Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC"° is by now well known to litigators in the financial institutions
arena. O'Melveny represents another setback for the FDIC and RTC
and raises the specter that defenses asserted previously by D&O defendants and stricken on motion may now be resuscitated, enabling
defendants to raise these defenses anew. Narrowly construed, the
Court held that state law and not federal common law determines the
liability of lawyers with regard to a professional negligence claim asserted by the FDIC."' The larger and more critical issue is whether
O'Melveny has restored an entire body of state law affirmative defenses previously rejected by federal courts.
Prior to O'Melveny, it appeared well settled that state law affirmative defenses, including claims of contributory negligence or failure to
mitigate by the bank or regulatory agencies, could not be pled by defendant directors and officers in actions brought by the thrift and
banking regulatory agencies. Cases dismissing state law defenses typically relied on two arguments: (1) under federal common law principles, federal regulators owed "no duty" to the directors and officers of
the failed S&Ls; and (2) it would be contrary to public policy to
charge agencies with the improper conduct of directors and officers.",
Courts also have relied, less frequently, on a third rationale: that regulatory agencies perform a discretionary function under the Federal
1 12
Tort Claims Act that is not subject to judicial second guessing.
O'Melveny casts doubt on the continuing validity of this previously
settled law. In O'Melveny, the FDIC, as receiver to an insolvent S&L,
sued a law firm that had represented the failed institution in risky real
estate deals, alleging state law claims of professional negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty." 3 0 'Melveny countered with various defenses seeking to impute the fraudulent conduct of the S&L officers to
the S&L and then to the FDIC as receiver." 4 The Supreme Court
considered the question of whether state law or federal common law
controlled the resolution of these state law defenses.
109. 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
110. Id- at 2053.
111. See, e.g., FDIC v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1438-40 (7th Cir. 1993); RTC v. Hecht, 818 F. Supp. 894, 900-01 (D.
Md. 1992); RTC v. Youngblood, 807 F. Supp. 765, 771-74 (N.D. Ga. 1992); FDIC v.
Isham, 782 F. Supp. 524,530-32 (D. Colo. 1992); FSLIC v. Burdette, 718 F. Supp. 649,
662-64 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); FSLIC v. Roy, Civ. JFM-87-1227, 1988 WL 96570, at *1-*2
(D. Md. June 28, 1988); FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184, 1204-06 (D. Md. 1984).
112. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-25 (1991); Bierman, 2 F.3d at
1439-41 (finding that RTC should not be held liable for discretionary decisions often
made under extreme time constraints); RTC v. Fleischer, 835 F. Supp. 1318, 1323-24
(D. Kan. 1993) (arguing that discretionary function exception to FTCA bars judicial
second guessing of decision by regulatory agencies).
113. O'Melveny, 114 S. Ct. at 2051-52.
114. Id at 2052.
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The Supreme Court unanimously held that state law controlled resolution of O'Melveny's defenses. 115 In a passage that has been frequently cited since the decision was handed down, the Court echoed
Erie's edict that "[t]here is no federal general common law."' 6 The
Court rejected the FDIC's claim that FIRREA was a nonexclusive
grant of rights that could be supplemented by federal common law.117
The Court instead held that state law supplies the rule of decision unless the federal statute explicitly does so." 8 The Court concluded that
creation of a special federal rule is permissible only in "situations
where there is a 'significant conflict between some federal policy or
interest and the use of state law.' """ The Court found no conflict
between state and-federal law based solely upon a federal interest in
uniformity, nor did it find that there would be harm to the FDIC's
insurance fund if state law doctrine defeated agency claims. As the
Court tersely held, "there is no federal policy that the fund should
always win.' 2 °
The O'Melveny decision has prompted a flurry of motions for reconsideration in cases where affirmative defenses had been stricken.
Although results have been mixed, a majority of federal courts have
interpreted O'Melveny as abolishing the old "no duty" rule, previously the applicable federal common law. Instead these courts have
concluded that state law defenses are permissible where not expressly
preempted by FIRREA.
An illustrative case is RTC v. Ross.' In Ross, the RTC filed a
motion to strike the defendants' affirmative defenses, including failure
to mitigate damages, estoppel and contributory negligence.' 2 The
123
court originally granted the RTC's motion, citing FDIC v. Mijalis
for the proposition that under the no duty rule defendants were precluded from shifting the focus to the conduct of the regulatory
agency. 24 Upon defendants' motion for reconsideration, however,
the district court reversed itself. It determined that "the federal common law 'no duty' rule cannot survive" the Supreme Court's decision
in O'Melveny, and it declined to follow the rationale of cases such as
FDIC v. Biernan125 and Mijalis.'26 The district court summarily re115. Id,at 2053.
116. Id. (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
117. Ia at 2053-55.
118. Id at 2054.
119. Id at 2055 (quoting Walis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966)).
120. Id
121. Civ. A. No. 2: 94CV20(P)(S), 1994 WL 534210 (S.D. Miss. June 22), rev'd on
reconsideration,1994 WL 534210, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 26, 1994).
122. Id at *1.
123. 15 F.3d 1314 (5th Cir. 1994).
124. Ross, 1994 WL 534210, at *2.
125. 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993).
126. Ross, 1994 WL 534210, at *4.
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jected the RTC's rote policy arguments regarding the need to preserve
the national insurance fund and, observing O'Melveny's admonition,
declined to create a federal rule of decision under the circumstances. 27 Other courts similarly have decided that whether affirmative defense claims are permissible must be determined solely by
reference to state law in the absence of a federal statute barring those
A minority of courts has attempted to distinguish
defenses.'
O'Melveny when possible. 2 9
The O'Melveny decision undoubtedly represents a significant victory for the defense bar because it appears to open the door to increased reliance on favorable statutory affirmative defenses. As
shown immediately below, no defense has been more instrumental to
D&O defendants than application of state statutes of limitations.
V.

TBE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ADVERSE DOMINATION

Under FIRREA, the receiver of a financial institution may bring
any claim on behalf of the institution within either three or five years
from the date the receiver was appointed, depending on the nature of
the action, 130 or until the state limitations period expires, whichever is
127. Id. at *6.
128. See, e.g., RTC v. Forest Grove, Inc., 33 F.3d 284, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
that O'Melveny supported the argument that state law governed the opening of confessed judgments), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995); RTC v. Liebert, 871 F. Supp.
370, 373 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that the federal common law "no duty" rule is an
"impermissible" addition to FIRREA and refusing to limit O'Melveny to defenses
directed at the conduct of private parties); RTC v. Baker, No. CIV. A. 93-0093, 1994
WL 637359, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1994) (holding that legal sufficiency of affirmative defenses must be analyzed under the laws of the state or FIRREA instead of
federal common law); RTC v. Wlliams, Civ. A. No. 93-2018-GTV, 1994 WL 477231,
at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 4, 1994) (stating that, after O'Melveny, estoppel and mitigation of
damages defenses are governed by state law or FIRREA).
129. See, e.g., RTC v. Edie, Civ. No. 94-772 (DRD), 1994 WL 744672, at *4 (D.NJ.
Oct. 4, 1994) (distinguishing O'Melveny because it did not implicate actions taken by
the FDIC in its discretionary capacity, and holding that the no duty rule insulates
discretionary FDIC actions); RTC v. Sands, 863 F. Supp. 365, 370 (N.D. Tex. 1994)
(finding O'Melveny inapplicable because RTC had brought suit in corporate, not receivership, capacity); RTC v. Bright, 157 F.R.D. 397, 400 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (holding
that the defenses of contributory negligence and mitigation of damages are unavailable where based on the post-conservatorship conduct of RTC). In the wake of
O'Melveny, the RTC may rely more heavily on arguments that the RTC's conduct is
insulated as a discretionary function exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
claiming that FIRREA delegated broad discretion to the agency to dispose of assets.
See, eg., RTC v. Fleischer, 871 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (D. Kan. 1994) (acknowledging
that other courts have viewed "the conservator or receiver's conduct in managing
failed financial institutions as insulated from affirmative defenses by the discretionary
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act").
130. In cases of fraud or intentional misconduct resulting in substantial loss to the
institution or in unjust enrichment, the limitations period is five years; for all other
claims, the limitations period is three years. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(14)(C) (Supp. V
1993).

2110

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

longer. 3 ' If the limitations period expires before the agency is appointed receiver, then the claim is stale and the receiver generally may
not revive the claim. 132 The agencies, however, have frequently
brought suit alleging D&O misconduct occurring outside the limitations period. To circumvent the applicable statute of limitations, the
RTC and FDIC have argued that the statute does not begin to run
until the alleged wrongdoers are no longer in control of the institution. In this way, the agencies seek to reach back and challenge D&O
conduct previously assumed to be impervious to suit because the limitations period had expired.
The tolling doctrine principally relied upon by the RTC and
FDIC-which has spawned a great volume of litigation-is referred
to as "adverse domination." Under this doctrine, the statute of limitations does not begin to run against a D&O unless and until the majority of the institution's board of directors is composed of disinterested
133
members-those not alleged to have participated in misconduct.
Courts instead presume that "control of the association by culpable
directors and officers precludes the possibility of filing suit because
these individuals can hardly be expected to sue themselves or to initiate any action contrary to their own interests."' 34 A more D&Ofriendly application of the doctrine allows tolling only where the entire board of directors is alleged to have participated in the misconapplication of the doctrine if just one
duct, thereby precluding 135
member is "disinterested."'
The RTC and the FDIC enjoyed the benefits of a judiciary too eager to please, as court after court adopted generous applications of the
tolling doctrine. 136 The Fourth and Fifth Circuits, however, stunned
the agencies with back-to-back decisions that greatly scaled back the
scope of the tolling doctrine. 37 In the process, the courts caused an
almost cataclysmic re-evaluation of the scope of the doctrine.
131. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(14), 1441a(b)(4) (Supp. V 1993).
132. RTC v. Artley, 28 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing FDIC v. Dawson, 4
F.3d 1303, 1307 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2673 (1994)). Claims for fraud
and intentional misconduct causing substantial loss to the institution or resulting in

unjust enrichment, however, may be revived if brought not more than five years from
the expiration of the state statute of limitations. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(14)(E) (Supp, V
1993); see also supra note 131 and accompanying text.
133. RTC v. Gallagher, 800 F. Supp. 595,600 (N.D. IIl. 1992), aff'd, 10 F.3d 416 (7th
Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Greenwood, 739 F. Supp. 450, 453 (C.D. Ill. 1989); FDIC v.
Howse, 736 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Hecht v. RTC, 635 A.2d 394, 407
(Md. 1994).
134. Hecht, 635 A.2d at 406 (quoting FDIC v. Bird, 516 F. Supp. 647, 652 (D.P.R.

1991) (citations omitted)).
135. Fleisher, 826 F. Supp. at 1276.

136. See supra note 134 (citing cases).
137. FDIC v. Cocke, 7 F.3d 396, 399-401 (4th Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d
1303, 1306-07 (5th Cir. 1993).
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In FDIC v. Cocke,138 the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia tolled the
limitations period only where a defendant has intentionally concealed
the wrongdoing from the plaintiff.' 39
"The character of fraud necessary to toll the statute [in Virginia]
must be of a variety involving moral turpitude. A defendant must
intend to conceal the discovery of the cause of action by trick or
artifice and must have thus actually concealed it from the plaintiff in
order for the exception to apply."' 40
That a majority (or all) of the directors may have been implicated in
the alleged wrongdoing was irrelevant; the limitations period would
be tolled only if the respective defendants fraudulently concealed the
alleged wrongdoing.' The Cocke decision has since formed the basis
for dismissals of other cases filed in Virginia' 2 and undoubtedly has
caused the government to reconsider suit in other instances.
In FDIC v. Dawson,'43 the Fifth Circuit agreed with the FDIC that
Texas followed the "majority test" of adverse domination.' Nonetheless, the court limited the scope of the doctrine, holding that adverse domination was inapplicable to claims of negligence 45 and that
the agency must show "that a majority of its directors was more than
negligent for the desired tolling period."' "6 In one fell swoop, the
Fifth Circuit lopped off a significant number of claims the RTC and
FDIC had brought or were preparing to bring. The Dawson case was
especially troubling for the agencies because no region has suffered
more bank and association failures than the Southwest and no other
Circuit has handled more D&O cases. 47
The damage inflicted upon the agencies by these cases extended far
beyond the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. After Cocke and Dawson were
decided, courts in other circuits began to shy away from the wholesale
adoption of the doctrine. Many found either that the respective fo138. 7 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1993).
139. Id at 402.
140. Id. (quoting Richmond Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 80
S.E2d 574, 582 (Va. 1954)).
141. Id.
142. See, ag., RTC v. Everhart, 37 F.3d 151, 155 (4th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Walde, 856
F. Supp. 281, 286 (E.D. Va. 1994).
143. 4 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir. 1993).
144. Id at 1310.
145. Id. at 1312.

146. Id. at 1313.
147. As of September 1, 1994, there were 38 cases pending in federal district courts
in the FAfth Circuit, compared to just one in the First Circuit, five in the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits and six in the Second Circuit. In petitions for certiorariin these case
(both of which were denied), the government contended that the Dawson ruling
threatened at least $500 million in FDIC claims and that the Cocke decision
threatened more than $13 billion in claims. See generally Bank Lawyer Liability, June
24, 1994, at 15-17 (discussing effect on RTC of rulings by various circuit courts).

2112

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

rum state has not adopted the principle, or it has adopted only a limited application of the doctrine.' 4
Reacting to the wave of government losses and to agency arguments
that they should not be barred from pursuing claims expiring before
their appointment, Congress considered RTC and FDIC sponsored
legislation that would have gone beyond the adverse domination doctrine. This legislation would have allowed the FDIC and RTC to revive stale claims so long as the limitations period did not expire more
than five years prior to the appointment of a receiver. According to
some legislation in this form was "virtually certain
trade publications,
1 49
to pass."'

In an attempt to compromise, the banking industry proposed its
own language, which would extend the limitations period only for intentional misconduct. Much to the disappointment of the agencies,
the final approved language largely tracked the industry proposal. As
a result, only claims of fraud, intentional misconduct resulting in unjust enrichment, and intentional misconduct resulting in substantial
loss to the institution may be revived, so long as the claim had not
expired more than five years before the institution failed and the RTC
or FDIC was appointed receiver. 50 Because only a fraction of the
misconprofessional liability suits are for fraud or other intentional
15
duct, the effect of the legislation has been minimal. 1
CONCLUSION

In the midst of the crisis atmosphere that pervaded the Halls of
Congress and was reflected in the opinions of the judiciary during the
thrift crisis, the RTC and FDIC wielded wide-ranging power with unbridled enthusiasm and arrogance. They aggressively sifted through
D&O's personal financial papers and brought dated claims for nothing more than mere negligence. Frequently, the agencies relied on the
148. See, e.g., RTC v. Artley, 28 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that Georgia has not adopted doctrine); RTC v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1157 (E.D. Pa. 1994)

(finding that doctrine may be applied in Pennsylvania only in cases that go beyond
mere negligence); Brandt v. Bassett, 855 F. Supp. 353, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (finding
that Florida has not adopted doctrine).
149. Legislation: Limitations-Buster Could Emerge from Conference This Week,
Bank Lawyer Liability, June 24, 1994, at 3.
150. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-328, § 201(a), 108 Stat. 2338, 2368 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(C)
(1994)).
151. In limiting the amendment to the revival of claims alleging intentional wrongdoing, the Senate-House Conference sided with the House against broader Senate
language favored by the agencies. House conferees repeatedly expressed satisfaction
with the final result. See, e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. H6776 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994) (statement of Cong. Fish) ("This extraordinary remedy [of revival] would allow the [agencies] to go after those most culpable of defrauding S&L institutions; but would not
reexpose every sitting or former board member to a suit in negligence. To allow the
revival of claims for mere negligence would be inequitable to those who are not actually responsible for the wrongdoing.").
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threat of multimillion dollar lawsuits to exact settlements from D&Os
and their insurance carriers who remained fearful of adverse publicity
and daunting legal fees.
The histrionics, however, have diminished, and perhaps as a result,
the courts have curtailed both the agencies' powers and their ambitions. Courts have modified the breadth of the agencies' subpoena
powers, recognized a national standard of care of gross negligence
(rendering claims for simple negligence not cognizable), permitted defendant D&Os to assert state defenses that were previously stricken,
and limited the application of broad tolling doctrines.
At the end of the day, notwithstanding the aggressive lawyering by
the RTC and the FDIC, total judgments and settlements obtained
through the end of 1994 were only $3 billion 15 -substantially less
than the $140 billion purportedly lost. Moreover, amounts actually
collected were somewhat less. During this time, the RTC pursued 564
claims to judgment or settlement. 153 The FDIC pursued 786 cases. In
one six month period, January 1, 1994
through June 30, 1994, the RTC
4
paid outside counsel $117 million.'1
All agree that any individual who commits a fraud or other intentional wrongdoing should be held accountable. The net, however,
should be cast no farther than necessary. It should not, for example,
be cast so wide and so far that scores of innocent people who have
dedicated their lives to financial institutions and the communities they
serve are inadvertently caught up with the rest. The recent developments have served to protect the innocents better while leaving intact
the agencies' statutory authority to investigate and prosecute claims.
The path to reason has had its bumps and thrills, but the most turbulent years are no doubt behind us. That is good news for those who
have opted to remain in the industry.

152. $13 billion has been recovered by the RTC and $1.7 billion by the FDIC
RTC, Division of Legal Services, PLS Fact Sheet (1995) (documenting RTC recoveries up to January 31, 1995 (on file with the author); Professional Liability-Recoveries Fact Sheets (1992-95) (documenting FDIC recoveries for the years (1990-94) (on

file with the author).
153. Id
154. I& These payments were made to 1876 firms. li

